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Military Control Over War News: 
The Implications of the Persian Gulf 
Stephen Cooper1 
 
News coverage of warfare poses a difficult problem for political systems with a free press, such as 
ours in the United States. In an era of high-tech weaponry and nearly instantaneous global com- 
munications, conflicts are inevitable between the obligation of the press to inform the general 
public, and the obligation of the military to successfully conduct war. The military’s controls over 
newsgathering during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War set off a controversy still smoldering during the 
Haiti occupation of 1994. This paper examines the legal, historical, and technological aspects of this 
issue. 
 
Introduction 
 
     The United States government’s decision to control newsgathering during the 1990-91 
Persian Gulf War sparked a lively debate in legal, journalistic, and academic circles. During this 
war, journalists were denied free access to the theater of operations during deployment and 
combat, and were restricted by a system of military escorts, pooled coverage, and military review 
of copy. Although similar restrictions were in place during the military operations in Grenada 
and Panama, the Persian Gulf War prompted the most serious challenges to the press restrictions, 
including lawsuits contesting their constitutionality. At issue are the legality and social desirabi-
lity of the restrictions, in a media system with libertarian and neoliberal underpinnings (Helle, 
1995). 
     From a legal perspective this question involves the First Amendment. Critical positions hold 
that the access restrictions constituted a de facto prior restraint of the press, and thus violated the 
First Amendment. Supportive positions point to legal precedents allowing government control of 
information on grounds of national security, and making a legal distinction between the 
protections afforded publishing and the protections afforded newsgathering. 
     The social dimensions of this question concern the functions of the press in a democratic 
society. Objections to the restrictions turn largely on the idea that the press serves an essential 
function as the watchdog of government actions. Careful scrutiny of military operations is 
critical, in this view, to the informed consent or disapproval of the American citizenry; press 
restrictions thus damage the political process by impeding the timely and accurate flow of 
information to the public. 
     The principal lawsuit filed during the Gulf War, Nation Magazine v. United States 
Department of Defense (1991) proved inconclusive in settling the issue of constitutionality.  
Since that time the Clinton administration has chosen in Somalia not to appreciably restrict the 
press, but in Haiti £0 prepare controls similar to those of the Gulf War. Arguably the news 
reports from Somalia, especially the picture coverage of the treatment of U.S. casualties and a  
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prisoner of war, pressured the president to redefine the U.S. mission there. The Somalian and 
Haitian situations thus provide a postscript to the Persian Gulf, regarding news coverage of post-
Cold War military operations. Technological developments in newsgathering and broadcasting, 
particularly live satellite transmission from the battlefront, have heightened the urgency of this 
issue.  
     This paper will explore the legal and institutional dimensions of the government controls over 
the press during the Persian Gulf War. It will argue that the controls were not a violation of the 
First Amendment, but rather a necessary restructuring of the ongoing relationship between the 
military and the press, driven by developments in electronic communications. 
 
The Legal Battle Over the Gulf War Press Restrictions 
 
     Serious questions were raised about the legality of the press restrictions in place during the 
Gulf War. Media outlets, interest groups, and journalists joined in lawsuits brought against the 
Department of Defense during the combat operations, charging the government with violating 
the First and Fifth Amendments (*1). Since the end of the war, a number of law journal articles 
have appeared, many of which judged the press restrictions to have been unconstitutional and 
argued forcefully that the military should never again be allowed to control the press to 
the degree it did in the Persian Gulf War. 
     Three lawsuits in all were filed challenging the constitutionality of the press restrictions. Two 
suits concerning access to the war zone in Kuwait were combined and heard in the United States 
District Court in New York, as Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept. of Defense (1991). A third suit, 
concerning the military’s refusal to allow picture coverage of casualties being returned to Dover 
Air Force Base in Delaware, was heard in the federal district court in Washington (JB Pictures, 
Inc. v. United States Department of Defense, 1991). In both trials the plaintiffs’ requests for 
injunctive and declarative relief were denied (*2). Of the two, Nation raises the issues most 
significant to this discussion. Does the press have, as the plaintiffs claimed, “a First Amendment 
right to unlimited access to a foreign arena in which American military forces are engaged” 
(Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 1561)? 
 
What Nation Did, and Did Not, Settle 
 
     There were two fundamental questions in the Nation suit: do courts have jurisdiction over the 
military’s control of the press, and if so, were the Gulf War restrictions constitutional? Whether a 
court could even entertain a challenge to the military hinged on three points: whether the 
plaintiffs had standing to file the complaint, whether it was a political question rather than a 
judicial question, and whether the issue had become moot. 
     The first task of the plaintiffs was to establish that the suit represented a complaint capable of 
judicial resolution, and that the plaintiffs had in fact suffered injury because of the defendants’         
actions. That the court, if it chose, could resolve the issue by striking down the press guidelines 
was clear. The plaintiffs claimed damage to their First Amendment rights to publish and Fifth 
Amendment guarantee of due process. The court found the plaintiffs to have standing to file 
the suit (Nation Magazine, pp. 1559 and 1561). 
     The second point concerned whether the issue was actually a political question disguised as a 
judicial matter. While noting that civilian courts have long been reluctant to intrude into military 
affairs, the Nation court observed that in this case the plaintiffs were not challenging “this 
country’s military establishment, its goals, directives or tactics” (Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 
1567) but rather objecting to the controls on newsgathering. Accordingly, the court determined 
this case to be a judicial question. 
     The press restrictions had been lifted by the time this case was heard, and the final point was 
whether the complaint had been rendered moot. Although an earlier case against the press 
restrictions in Grenada had been thrown out on this ground (Flynt v. Weinberger, 1984; 
Kenealey, 1992, p. 295), the Nation court observed that the question was likely to arise again in 
the next war. An exception to the mootness principle occurs when the injury is too short in 
duration to be litigated before it stops, but may occur again; that is, the action is “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review” (Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 1568). The court found that even 
though the provocation for the suit had been removed, the issue itself was not moot. 
     Having heard the case, the court denied the requests for injunctive and declarative relief. The 
decision was handed down after the cessation of hostilities and the lifting of the press restrict-
ions; an injunction was pointless by then. The decision noted that an issue such as this was likely 
to arise in a future conflict, which would suggest declarative relief. Nonetheless the court refused 
to rule on the constitutionality of the particular restrictions used in the Gulf War, seeming to 
defer to future action by the Supreme Court (see Nation Magazine, 1991, p. 1560). While the 
decision was not satisfactory to those advocating an absolute right of press access, Nation did 
establish precedent for judicial review of military controls on the press. Yes, the media could 
raise legal challenges to access restrictions and have their day in court. 
 
But Which Supreme Court Doctrine Should Apply To Wartime? 
 
     Three doctrines exist which might be applied to press coverage of war: prior restraint, public 
forum, and right of access to information. Despite some legal commentators’ enthusiasm for 
applying it to the Gulf War restrictions (e.g., Boydston, 1992 & Smith, J. E., 1993) the Supreme 
Court doctrine of prior restraint, if carefully considered, is not the proper framework. Prior 
restraint, prohibiting the publication of information in the possession of the press, bears a 
heavy burden of proof. While the cases of Schenck v. U.S. ( 1919) and Near v. Minnesota ( 1931) 
had recognized national security interests as justification for prior restraint, the “Pentagon 
Papers” case, known formally as New York Times Co. v. U.S. (1971), established how difficult it 
would be for the government to make such an argument. There is very little possibility, if the 
press restrictions were indeed a case of prior restraint, that they would be upheld. The critical 
point here, however, is that information gathering, not publication, was the issue in the Gulf 
War. The doctrine of prior restraint, while convenient for opponents of the press restrictions, is 
not appropriate to considering a question of access to information. 
     Another possibility is the doctrine of the public forum. If the news process is considered to be 
expressive activity is the military barred from restricting the press activities? The public forum 
cases protect against government interference in places traditionally open to the public for debate 
and expression (Smolla, 1992, p. 208-211). By contrast, “the Supreme Court has expressly ruled 
that military bases are not public fora” (Kenealey, 1992, p. 303). Again, arguing against the 
Gulf War restrictions on this basis misapplies “a doctrine designed to protect expressive 
activities to activities that involve the gathering of information” (Cassell, 1985, p. 951). 
     The doctrines of prior restraint and public forum are tangential to the question at hand. Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have begun to delineate a limited right of access to information, and it 
is in this context that the Gulf War restrictions should be considered. 
 
The Supreme Court, the Press, and a Limited Right of Access 
 
     The First Amendment guarantees freedoms of speech and publishing. The “Pentagon Papers” 
case was a ringing endorsement of the freedom to publish, even when the material was obtained 
illegally. By contrast, a right of the press to acquire information is not so clear cut. 
 
In contrast to the well-established doctrine that prior restraints are 
presumptively invalid in all but the most extreme circumstances, the right of 
journalistic access to news, or to places where news is found, is one that the Supreme 
Court has never even recognized. In fact, many cases expressly state that no such 
constitutional right exists, except as a figment of publishers’ imaginations (Jacobs, 1992, 
p. 678). 
 
     In particular, there has been no decision on the rights of the press to obtain information on a 
military operation (Olson, 1992, p. 525). There are a number of decisions granting the press 
access to government information in nonmilitary situations, but these in fact are quite specific in 
their application despite much advocacy for a broader right comparable to that of free speech 
(e.g., Kenealey, 1992, p. 311 & Smith, J. E., 1993, p. 338). 
     Ironically enough the language suggesting a right of access first appeared in a case in which 
the Supreme Court denied reporters’ First Amendment claims. In Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) the 
Court rejected journalists’ arguments that the guarantee of a free press implied a right to 
withhold the names of their confidential sources from a grand jury. While noting that “newsmen 
have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is 
excluded” (Branzburg, 1972, p.p. 684-685), the decision was nonetheless careful to rein in the 
inference that might have been drawn: “Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify 
for First Amendment protection: without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of 
the press could be eviscerated.” (Branzburg, 1972, p. 681). As cautious and limited as the 
reference may seem, this passage is the source of later assertions that a right of access exists. 
     The Court directly took up the question of a putative right of access two years later in Pell v. 
Procunier (1974) and Saxbe v. The Washington Post Co. (1974). Bothe cases dealt with 
reporters’ demands to conduct interviews with prison inmates, requests which had been denied 
by state and federal prison authorities. In both cases the embryonic right of access fared badly: 
the Court determined that no violation of the First Amendment had in fact occurred. The decision 
in Pell, written by Justice Potter Stewart (Pell v. Procunier, 1974), makes a sharp distinction 
between the press’ freedom to try to obtain information and a government obligation to provide 
sources. 
 
 It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information  
 Not available to members of the general public….It is quite another thing to  
suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to 
make available to journalists sources of information not available to members 
of the public generally (p. 834). 
 
     While the press had no luck in getting access to restricted areas of prisons (Pell v. Procunier, 
1974; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 1974; Houchins v. KQED, 1978), it fared much better with 
regard to criminal trials. Two cases, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980) and Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk (1981) established that government 
restrictions on access to trials must satisfy a stringent three-part test. 
     In Richmond Newspapers the Court found that the press indeed had a right to attend criminal 
trials, just as the public did. The decision, written by Chief Justice Burger, noted that “a pre-
sumption of openness adheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice” 
(Richmond Newspapers, 1980, p. 573). A separate concurrence by Justice Stevens broadened the 
scope considerably: “the First Amendment protects the public and the press from abridgment of 
their rights of access to information about the operation of their government” (Richmond 
Newspapers, 1980, p. 584). Justice Brennan in his separate concurrence supported “the special 
nature of a claim of First Amendment right to gather information” (Richmond Newspapers, 1980, 
p. 586) (*3). 
     Details of how the government would have to justify restricting access were forthcoming in 
Globe Newspaper (1981). The Court struck down a Massachusetts law excluding the press from 
trials of sex crimes involving minors, again affirming that trials were presumptively open to the 
public, and that the press performed a valuable service in bringing information to the public. 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion delineated three points on which the question of press access 
turned: “the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public” (Globe 
Newspaper, 1981, p. 605); “the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant 
role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole” (Globe News-
paper, 1981, p. 606); denial of access must be “necessitated by a compelling governmental 
interest, and…narrowly tailored to serve that interest” (Globe Newspaper, 1981, p. 607). 
     Not all justices shared Justice Brennan’s apparent enthusiasm for looking at the big picture. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s separate concurrence in Globe specifically disclaimed any 
broader applicability of the decision: “I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court’s 
decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials” (Globe News-
paper, 1981, p. 611). The dissent of Justices Burger and Rehnquist criticized the majority 
opinion’s “expansive interpretation” (Globe Newspaper, 1981, p. 613). 
     Given the ambiguity whether the Globe decision should extend to press coverage of war, it is 
not surprising that the Nation court was so reluctant to apply it to the Gulf War restrictions. 
Nonetheless, legal scholars, eager for a broad statement of principle, have looked to Globe to 
provide guidance, variously arguing that Globe supports both positions on the constitutionality of 
the restrictions (for example, Boydston 1992, p. 1098; Cassell, 1985, pp. 958-959; Kenealey, 
1992, p. 309; Smith, J. E., 1993, pp. 309-311). Both sides seem ready to accept the applicability 
of Globe to the Gulf War access restrictions, and argue the specifics. 
 
The three conditions of the Globe decision can be generalized in this way: 
First, a claimant [of access] must show that the place ‘historically had been 
open to the press and general public.’ Second, the right of access must ‘play 
a particularly significant role’ in the functioning of the process in question and 
of the government as a whole. Finally, if these two elements have been 
satisfied, access may be denied if the government establishes that ‘the denial 
is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest’ (Cassell, 1985, pp. 958-959). 
 
     If the assumption is made that the Globe test is applicable to situations beyond criminal trials, 
as lower courts have subsequently clone (Kenealey, 1992, pp. 309-311), the question becomes 
whether the Gulf War combat theater was exempt from press access under the terms outlined 
above. The first prong of the Globe test requires an examination of how war has traditionally 
been covered by the American press. 
 
The Historical Context: A Brief Look At American War Reportage 
 
     Reportage of early conflicts in America’s history was both unrestricted and haphazard, with 
much of the press’ information coming from soldiers’ correspondence (Kenealey, 1992, pp. 312-
313). Prior to the Civil War, reports from the battlefront were so slow to arrive that there were 
few concerns about their threat to military security (Jacobs, 1992, p. 679; Olson, 1992, p. 514). 
With the introduction of the telegraph and the professionalization of the press in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, the situation changed dramatically. Both postpublication sanctions and 
access restrictions were common during the Civil War in the North and the South. Government 
control of the press extended even to the extreme of shutting down newspapers (Boydston, 1992, 
pp. 1076-1077; Jacobs, 1992, p. 680). 
     Press restrictions during the Spanish-American War also seem harsh by present-day expecta-
tions. “Censors were stationed at key telegraph offices to monitor incoming dispatches, although 
reporters remained free to roam the battlefield” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 680). The timeliness of tele-
graphed dispatches created a new strategic value in the information; the government response 
was to control the content of the dispatches at the point of a technological bottleneck. 
     Similar restrictions continued during World War I. While they could travel freely in the 
theater of operations of the American Expeditionary Force, American reporters were required to 
obtain accreditation, one condition of which was that “[t]he newspaper representative was to 
submit all correspondence, except personal letters, to the press officer or his assistant…and, the 
correspondent agreed to accept the press officer’s instructions as to further censorship rules from 
time to time” (Boydston, 1992, p. 1078)(*4). During this time the Supreme Court upheld a 
number of convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917, which prohibited certain antiwar 
expressions. While most cases concerned speakers and pamphleteers (Franklin, 1987, p. 47; 
Hixson, 1989, pp. 288-298), the editors of two German-language newspapers were held to have 
violated the Espionage Act by publishing material disparaging the American military (Schaefer 
v. U.S., 1920). This war saw two innovations in shaping the war coverage: “the public informa-
tion specialist and a bureau to issue war reports” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 681).  
     Press pools were widely used for the first time in World War II (Olson, 1992, p. 516). 
Reporters were allowed to travel relatively freely, although not completely without restrictions 
(Cassell, 1985, p. 939). Again, the trade-off took the form of censorship. President Roosevelt set 
up the United States Office of Censorship, which “instituted a system of voluntary self-
censorship for the press and issued A Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press” 
(Boydston, 1992, pp. 1079-1080). While censorship was nominally voluntary, field commanders 
had latitude in controlling the flow of news information, and some imposed harsh restrictions 
(Jacobs, 1992, p. 682). In addition, the price of accreditation as a correspondent was signing an 
agreement to submit all copy for military review (Cassell, 1985, p. 938), as it had been during 
World War I. 
     In Korea, press censorship initially was voluntary (Boydston, 1992, p. 1080). Criticism of the 
American command’s performance so outraged General Douglas MacArthur (Olson, 1992, p. 
518) that the journalists themselves eventually requested a formal system of censorship (Cassell, 
1985, p. 940). To journalists, censorship was a protection from the wrath of MacArthur,  
described as “You-write-what-you-like-and-we’ll-shoot-you-if-we-don’t-like-it” (Jacobs, 1992, 
p. 683). 
     The Vietnam War stands alone in American journalistic history in terms of freedom of access, 
freedom from review of dispatches, and even logistical support in getting reporters to the 
battlefield.  
 
In previous conflicts, censorship was uneven but pervasive. During the Vietnam  
War, however, the Pentagon imposed neither censorship by restricted access nor 
censorship by prepublication review…Reporters were free to venture almost  
anywhere at any time and to write about whatever interested them (Jacobs, 1992,  
pp. 683-684). 
 
The price of this unprecedented freedom was merely voluntary adherence to a set of guidelines 
regarding military security (Boydston, 1992, p. 1081). Relations  between the military command 
and the press deteriorated as the press reports became progressively more critical, and “while 
war correspondents had traditionally served as instruments of their country, press boosterism 
slowly and painfully eroded” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 684). Television reportage was a potent weapon 
in the newly adversarial relationship between the press and the military: “graphic war footage 
and stories of American atrocities undermined the public’s will to support the war” (Olson, 1992, 
p. 519). Despite the controversy connected with this war, the military never instituted any form 
of censorship other than voluntary security guidelines, although some actions were conducted in 
secrecy, notably the bombing of Laos and Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 (Cassell, 1985, p. 942). 
     The 1983 action in Grenada marked a different kind of first: reporters were not allowed to 
accompany an invasion force. On the third day of the operation, a group of reporters was 
escorted around the island for a few hours. Full press access to Grenada did not come until the 
sixth day, when the fighting was effectively over (Kenealey, 1992, pp. 316-317; Olson, 1992, pp. 
520-521). Journalists railed against these restrictions, yet the public seemed by and large to 
support the policy (Cassell, 1985, pp. 944-945). 
     Press furor took two forms: a lawsuit and editorial complaints. The lawsuit, Flint v. 
Weinberger (1984), was dismissed by a federal district court as moot, and the finding upheld on 
appeal (Jacobs, 1992, p. 715; Olson, 1992, pp. 525-526). The bitter complaints of the press led 
the military to convene a panel to develop policy on wartime press coverage. The Sidle Panel, 
named after its chairman, retired Major General Winant Sidle, produced a set of recommend-
ations, including “the largest possible pooling procedure to be in place for the minimum time 
possible” and “voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines or ground rules 
established and issued by the military” (Cassell, 1985, p. 946). 
     The press’ cautious acceptance of the Sidle Panel’s report evaporated with the 1989 operation 
in Panama. The press pool was not allowed to accompany the first invasion forces, and once in 
Panama was again delayed for military escorts and transportation (Olson, 1992, p. 522). Again, 
the action was of short duration, and the serious fighting was over by the rime the press had the 
opportunity to visit the battlefield (Boydston, 1992, p. 1083; Smith, J. E., 1993, p. 300). 
     The Persian Gulf War continued pooling, military escorts, and review of the dispatches (*5). 
The major objections of the press concerned restricted access in the form of pooling, delays in 
the transmission of stories for copy review, and military escorts’ interference in reporters’ 
interviews with the troops (Dennis, Stebenne, Paulik, Thalhimer, LaMay, Smillie, FitzSimon, 
Gazsi, & Rachlin, 1991, p. 19), although some journalists working outside the press pools 
claimed they were harassed by members of the armed forces (Committee to Protect Journalists, 
1992, pp. 167-169). Censorship per se, however, was minimal. Few stories were altered as a 
result of military review (Dennis et al., 1991, pp. 26-30), and the guidelines provided that the 
news organizations, not the military, would make the final determination in the event of a dispute 
(Nation Magazine, 1991, pp. 1577-1578) (*6). 
     Last-minute diplomatic initiatives were able to avert war in Haiti in the fall of 1994, but the 
Department of Defense had prepared for a full-scale military invasion. Press guidelines were 
similar to those in the Persian Gulf War, and again included provisions for military escorts, 
review of reporters’ copy for violations of the security ground rules, and a requirement that 
reporters obtain accreditation before being allowed access to the front (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1994a) (*7). The media ground rules were also similar to those issued during the Gulf 
War, and in addition to detailing specific kinds of information that could not be reported without 
jeopardizing the correspondent’s accreditation, left open the options of restricted access and 
press pools (U.S. Department of Defense, 1994b)(*8). 
 
Military Operations and the Globe Newspaper Test 
 
Is There a Tradition of Openness? 
 
     That criminal trials have historically been open is clear. Battlefields and military bases, 
however, are not presumptively open to the public as are trials and public fora. While control 
over making war and funding military forces is firmly in civilian hands, a power tracing back to 
Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, in fact there is not a tradition of 
complete public access to areas in which the military operates, nor complete public access to 
information in possession of the military. If the Globe test is taken literally, “there is no tradition 
of public openness” with regard to military operations (Cassell, 1985, p. 959). 
     While the general public has not enjoyed access to the battlefront since the early engagements 
of the Civil War, an argument can be made that the press acts as a surrogate for the public in its 
scrutiny of government activities. Justice Powell’s dissent in Saxbe (1974) makes such an 
argument. 
 
In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at 
large…By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political 
process, the press perfoms a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose 
of the First Amendment (p. 863). 
 
     Thus, situations historically open to the press might be construed as, in effect, open to the 
public. Accredited correspondents have long had some kind of access to war. If not to the public 
itself, is there a tradition of openness to the press? Press complaints about the Pentagon’s 
restrictions in the Gulf War were long, loud, and often adversarial (e.g., Browne, 1991; Cronkite, 
1991; Kurtz, 1991; 
________________________ 
Rykken, 1991; Schanberg, 1991). Review of the historical context of American press coverage of 
warfare, however, suggests that the Gulf War restrictions were neither extraordinary nor 
unusually restrictive by comparison to the heavy-handed controls frequently in place prior to the 
Vietnam War; in fact, “wartime regulation of the press is hardly a recent development” Jacobs, 
1992, p. 677). While some writers decry the pool coverage begun in the Grenada action as an 
unconstitutional encroachment on the press freedom benchmarked by Vietnam (e.g., Smith, J. E., 
1993) it is historically more accurate to see Vietnam as the exception rather than the rule (Jacobs, 
1992, pp. 683-684).  
     The pool coverage system used in the Persian Gulf, Grenada, and Panama is not simply a 
regression of a historical trend of ever-freer press coverage of combat. There are two distinct 
trends moving in opposing directions: access to the front has become more restrictive, as 
interference with news copy has become less restrictive. Some would rather the press gain 
greater access at the expense of censorship (Cronkite, 1991); others fear that demands for greater 
access may bring exactly that trade-off (Cassell, 1985; Jacobs, 1992). Regardless of how one 
might fell about the desirability of the situation, in fact “the press has been able to view wartime 
operations only at the sufferance of the military” (Cassell, 1985, p. 959, footnote 210), and courts 
have rightly been reluctant to second-guess “when the cost of judicial error is so high” (Jacobs, 
1992, p. 703).  
     The complaints of some journalists that the military was unwilling to accredit a sufficient 
number of correspondents to properly cover the war are simply not warranted; there were more 
correspondents in the field during the Gulf War than in Vietnam. 
 In the end, an average of 165 reporters and support personnel were put into 
 U.S. units in fourteen pools and allowed to cover the [Gulf] war. By comparison, 
  of the 461 reporters with the Eisenhower HQ in England, only twenty-seven  
eventually went with U.S. forces on D-Day. By the media’s own estimates, there  
were never more than seventy-five reporters out ‘in the bush’ under fire at any one  
time in Vietnam (Sherman, 1992, p. 647). 
 
     Nor is it credible to suggest, for instance, that coverage of World War II was open objective 
(see Fussell, 1989), while the Persian Gulf coverage was made-to-order government propaganda 
(see Parenti, 1993, pp. 163-171). In military operations other than Vietnam, the press enjoyed 
access only at the cost of censorship of its copy, which is no longer a legally or socially palatable 
tradeoff. 
Is Press Access Significant to the Process? 
 
     It is hard to argue that public scrutiny helps the military in the conduct of war; on the 
contrary, secrecy is of prime operational importance (Ciausewitz, 1832/1’993, pp. 233-234). One 
of the few exceptions the Supreme Court has recognized to the First Amendment right of free 
speech concerns matters of national security during wartime. 
 
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are 
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right (Near v. Minnesota. 1931, p. 716). 
 
     The communication technology used in contemporary journalism is radically different from 
that used in earlier wars (Sherman, 1992, pp. 636-637), chiefly in the speed with which field 
reports are processed and disseminated (*9). The heightened security concerns of the military are 
well founded: real-time news broadcasts eliminate any possibility of security review of the 
material before it becomes public. Technology changes have been significant not only in the 
news process, but in the conduct of warfare. Smart bombs and stealth fighters illustrate the 
strategic importance of information to modern warfare. The more technology dependent warfare 
becomes, the more critical is the control of technical information and the more difficult the task 
of controlling it (Smolla, 1992, p. 304). 
     Now that global television coverage is commonplace, news broadcasts can easily serve as 
intelligence for the enemy: “even the most careless newspaper reporter has her work scanned by 
editors, while the remarks of a television reporter broadcasting live go unchecked, straight from 
her mouth to Saddam Hussein’s ears” (Jacobs, 1992, p. 709). In World War II, a serious breach 
of the security guidelines occurred when a reporter revealed that the Allies had been able to 
crack the Japanese naval code (Jacobs, 1992, p. 682). No apparent harm came of the article, 
which was published in the Chicago Tribune, but the potential damage of a comparable tele-
vision story today is clearly much greater. In the Gulf War, a story on how the Air Force located 
and destroyed Iraqi tanks was subsequently judged by the military to have breached security 
guidelines, and the information may well have been useful to the Iraqi forces (Dennis et al., 
1991, p. 20). More recently, a television news executive, explaining CNN’s decision to delay 
reporting on military planes taking off for Haiti, acknowledged the unique ability of live 
television coverage to compromise a military operation: “Unlike the print process, our work is 
instantly available to global eyes: friend, foe, neutral alike” (Turner, 1994). 
     Such a dramatic increase in the speed of transporting some material (in this case, information 
about warfare) is likely to produce a crisis in the control of that material (Beniger, 1986). The 
speed and geographical coverage of satellite communications have effectively rendered the 
traditional security controls over reporters’ copy obsolete, chiefly by eliminating opportunities to 
review the copy before broadcast. With little or no time remaining between the origination of the 
pictures and reception by worldwide viewers, the military’s access restrictions can fairly be seen 
as the attempt to rebuild a control mechanism capable of satisfying its legitimate need for 
secrecy. 
     Beyond the strategic concerns of the military is the larger context: the role of public informa-
tion in policy formation and implementation. While war needs to be waged in relative secrecy, 
our form of government requires policy to be formed in relative openness. The dilemma is that 
while “[s]peech concerning national security is unique in its potential for catastrophe…[s]ecrecy 
is the antithesis of free speech and an anathema to an open democracy” (Smolla, 1992, p. 303). 
     In the late twentieth century the prevailing image of the press is that of watchdog: the press 
provides the checking force on the three branches of Federal government (Stewart, 1982; 
Boydston, 1992, p. 1096), guarding against possible abuses of power. This is essentially a re-
formist role (Gans, 1980, pp. 68-69); the value of the press to the public is that it draws attention 
to undesirable governmental policies or actions and stimulates change. The tie between the press 
and various reform movements is a long-standing tradition, elating back to the middle 1800’s 
(Dicken-Garcia, 1989, pp. 40-41). While the press can exert influence on public discourse in 
various ways, including agenda-setting and issue framing (Iyengar & Simon, 1993), the essence 
of the press’ challenge to the power structure is its demand for self-reform. The news industry’s 
protests about the Gulf War restrictions are good examples of such calls for change (* 10). 
     A source of frustration to the press, in fact, is the public’s acceptance of the restrictions 
(Dennis et al., 1991, p. 82 ff.). Far from seeing the constraints on information flow as a violation 
of either their right to know or their vital interest in monitoring the government’s actions, ordin-
ary citizens for the most part reacted favorably (*11). While the press may have seen a righteous 
conflict between itself and the military (e.g., Browne, 1991), the public clearly wanted the press 
to play on the military’s team. 
     The military’s aversion to microscopic scrutiny by the press has at least some basis in the way 
the press chooses to cover war, and in the recognition that the commercial environment of the 
news media can drive the coverage toward “a sensationalized focus on emotional issues…in a 
desperate search for high ratings” (Sherman, 1992, p. 638). Battlefield reports can easily 
exaggerate the importance of a single event or viewpoint at the expense of the deeper policy  
issues (*12). Journalists may not completely understand military situations, yet their commentary 
can carry a weight disproportionate to their expertise. One military expert noted that in the Gulf 
War coverage “ [a] gross mistake repeated over and over tended to gain a level of legitimacy” 
(Smith, P.M., 1991, p. 131). 
     The government’s concern about the effect of press coverage on the home front is longstand-
ing, and realistic. The carnage of warfare is something the American public has not confronted 
directly since the Civil War; American soil has never been the target of aerial bombing, a painful 
memory in other parts of the world. On the whole, war reportage has spared the public the very 
most grotesque images of war (See Fussell, 1989, for rather unvarnished descriptions of the 
anatomical remains of battle.) 
     Faced with graphic evidence of the horror of war, the public may lose the will to wage it 
(Olson, 1992, p. 519), even though they might agree the situation required such use of brutal 
force. It is plausible that military operations in the Gulf War might have continued into Iraq (and 
many now argue that they should have) had the scenes of carnage on the highway out of Kuwait 
City not come to national attention so dramatically. The images of the air war in the Persian 
Gulf, on the other hand, seemed cleaner and thus easier to accept, perhaps fulfilling a hope that 
“the war could be won by shrewd Yankee technological expedients, like, for example, bombing 
from costly airplanes flying at safe altitudes” (as Fussell, 1989, p. 13 comments about World 
War II). 
     While it is a tribute to our humanity that we abhor the brutality to which war coverage bears 
testimony, that emotion may not always be the wisest basis on which to debate waging war, or to 
decide military strategy once combat has begun. 
 
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to 
disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this 
is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must 
be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come 
from kindness are the very worst (Ciausewitz, 1832/1993, pp. 83-84). 
 
     If the primary reason for a free press is “its function of providing information to the public so 
that the citizenry may adequately govern” (Kenealey, 1992, p. 320) the information being pro-
vided must be appropriate to that governance. Even if the press has unimpeded access to the 
front, the public is still not guaranteed that it will obtain information useful for reasoned 
consideration of policy. 
 
Broadly speaking, disputes over the use of American troops often will center 
not on precisely what the troops were doing or what t11e conditions surrounding 
their involvement were, but rather on the propriety of using force as an 
instrument of national policy. In such disputes, press access to the battlefield 
is simply irrelevant (Cassell, 1985, p. 968). 
     It is interesting to note the arenas in which various interested parties chose to contest the issue 
of the Gulf War restrictions. The progressive news organizations, Congressmen, and academics 
chose the courts, via the Nation suit, as the venue in which to advance their interests. Because 
they have comparatively less clout in the media marketplace, the institutional level was the best 
choice for these stakeholders. On the other hand, the mainstream press and the military engaged 
in the arena of public discourse, via op-ed broadsides on the one hand and public relations 
strategies on the other. Since public support is “capital” vital to both these heavyweights, we 
might think of this as a struggle for positional advantage in the marketplace of ideas. Through 
the lens of an economist, the argument over the Gulf War press restrictions would appear as a 
negotiation of transaction costs for the interested parties (see Pejovich, 1990, pp. 38-41 for 
discussion of transaction costs). 
     Whether in support of a war or in opposition to it, press coverage is at best imperfect 
information serving an imperfect discourse on matters of utmost importance. If war is best 
waged in secrecy, and public decisions best made with full knowledge, then military operations 
exist in a state of tension between those two imperatives. In an open democracy such as America, 
public opinion about a military operation is of crucial significance to the operation’s success. 
Changes in communication technology have forced us to reconsider the balance between 
the need to hide and the need to know. 
 
Is There a Compelling Government Interest?  
Were the Restrictions Narrowly Drawn? 
 
     The press, for its part, has been adamant in framing the press restrictions as a government 
power play in an adversarial relationship between itself and the military (for example, Cronkite, 
1991; Denniston, 1991; Kurtz, 1991; Rykken, 1991; Schanberg, 1991; Sloyan, 1992), an animos-
ity it says dates back to Vietnam. One journalist comments, “I cannot entirely dismiss from my 
mind the anti-press cant that has pervaded American military journals and pronouncements  
ever since the Vietnam War” (Browne, 1991, p. 30). Another is more direct: “The military is 
acting on a generally discredited Pentagon myth that the Vietnam War was lost because of the 
uncensored press coverage’’ (Cronkite, 1991). While the military has repeatedly justified the 
restrictions on grounds of operational security and protection for the reporters themselves (for 
example, Gersh, 1991; “Pete Williams Debriefs,” 1991; “Press, Politicians Weigh Coverage,” 
1991), many journalists simply do not accept that explanation. The Gulf War restrictions were, in 
their view, a thinly disguised public relations strategy to keep the home front supportive of the 
war effort. 
 
So it’s all too clear that the current restrictions have noti1ing to do with military 
security and everything to do with political security. Political security requires 
that the government do as complete a job as possible at blacking out stories that 
might lead to embarrassment or criticism of the government or to questions 
from ordinary Americans about t11e war policy (Schanberg, 1991, pp. 24-25). 
 
     Even if the press’ deconstruction of the military’s pool system is true, and the real intent of 
the restrictions was to muzzle the kind of critical reportage which fueled public discontent with 
the Vietnam War, the operational security concerns raised by instantaneous electronic communi-
cations still remain. 
 
The problem with the pool system is that it became a convenient tool to reward 
and punish reporters for the stories they wrote, and to keep journalists from 
learning embarrassing or unfavorable information. However…the existence 
of an illegitimate purpose does not negate a legitimate purpose (Jacobs, 1992, 
p. 722). 
     It is likely that the press guidelines issued for the Haiti operation in the fall of 1994 would 
have sparked similar complaints had actual combat broken out. While news executives were 
pleased that they were able to deploy equipment and correspondents on Haiti in advance of an 
expected U.S. invasion force (Carter, 1994a), some journalists nonetheless denounced the press 
guidelines as too similar to those of the Gulf War (“Military Censorship Lives,” 1994). It is 
worth noting, however, that the television networks agreed to a White House request to delay 
reports that planes carrying paratroopers were en route to Haiti, and cited concern for the success 
of the operation as the reason (Carter, 1994b). 
     While some in the press might be willing to volunteer for censorship of television and print 
reports in exchange for freer access (Cronkite, 1991), the doctrine of press freedom defined by 
the Pentagon Papers case bars such clear-cut prior restraint. In the final analysis, access restrict-
ions may be the only way to guarantee protection of national security interests when technology 
has reduced transmission times to nearly zero.  
 
And the Bottom Line Is… 
 
     This paper cannot resolve whether there ought to be such a thing as war. History tells us there 
is, and current events suggest there will be. Since Vietnam the public has a clearer picture of the 
horrors of war; our struggles over the depiction of war have a direct outcome in our ability to 
successfully conduct war. The press’ interest in showing war in its raw and uncut form is a 
legitimate interest, as is the military’s interest in controlling information. In modern televised 
warfare, information is armament, not just in the technical and strategic realms but in the effect 
news stories can have on policy formation. 
     However deeply the press may feel it is entitled to legal protection from the military’s 
controls, warfare is exempted by the Globe Newspaper test. The access restrictions in place 
during the Persian Gulf War, and those prepared for a possible war in Haiti, were constitutional. 
     That press access to the battlefield is socially desirable is at least arguable. That such access is 
a right guaranteed by the First Amendment is contrary to constitutional law. If the press is to win 
greater freedom in covering war, it will likely fare better in the marketplace of public opinion 
than in the courts. 
 
Notes 
 
(*l) While no mainstream news organization chose to challenge the press restrictions in court, 
the list of plaintiffs in Nation Magazine is a who’s who of the American progressive journalism 
world. Joined in this suit are Nation, Harper’s, In These Times, Pacific News Service, The 
Guardian, The Progressive. Mother Jones, The L.A. Weekly, The Village Voice, The Texas 
Observer, Pacifica Radio News. Sydney H. Schanberg, E. L. Doctorow, William Styron. Michael 
Klare, and Scott Armstrong, plus a separate lawsuit filed by Agence France-Presse. The list of 
interested parties with amicus curiae briefs included thirteen members of Congress, the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, and academics Ben Bagdikian, 
Todd Gitlin, and Herbert L Schiller, among others. The defendants included Secretary of  
Defense Richard Cheney, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Peter Williams, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and President of the United States 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces George Bush. While the mainstream press did not 
join in this suit (see Parenti, 1993, p. 167 for criticism on this Nation Magazine v. U.S. Dept. of 
Defense nonetheless was fraught with the possibility of kind of defeat for the military. 
 
(*2) Injunctive relief halts an activity in progress. Declarative relief prohibits the action in the    
future. 
 
(*3) The delicate balancing of the public’s right to know and the legitimate need to keep certain 
information confidential is evident in Justice Brennan’s concurrence:  
 
[T]he First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as 
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access 
to information…Yet the Court has not ruled out a public access component 
to the First Amendment in every circumstance…[A]ny privilege of access 
to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the 
nature of the information and countervailing interests in security and 
confidentiality (Richmond Newspapers, 1980, p. 585-586). 
 
(*4) Quotation is from an agreement signed by accredited correspondents, cited in Boydston, 
1992, p. 1078, footnote 58. 
 
(*5) Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. American forces were deployed on August 
8, followed by the press pool on August 12. On August 26 the pool was abolished and access 
allowed to all accredited journalists. In advance of the hostilities, the Department of Defense 
renewed pooling on January 7, 1991 and added review of stories and military escorts to the 
requirements. The air war began on January 16, and the ground offensive on February 24. Pool 
coverage of the ground warfare was blacked out for forty-eight hours at the start of the ground 
campaign; dispatches from correspondents accompanying the ground forces were delayed. 
Hostilities ceased on February 27, and all press restrictions ended on March 4. (See Olson, 1992, 
pp. 512-513). 
     The Nation suit was filed on January 10, 1991, prior to the start of the air war, and decided on 
April 16, 1991, after the restrictions had been lifted. 
 
(*6) The full texts of the ground rules, media guidelines, and operating policies of the press pools 
appear in the appendices of Nation Magazine, 1991, pp. 1575-1582. 
 
(*7) Note the following passages from the Defense Department’s “Guidelines for News Media,” 
issued September 16, 1994:  
 
Media representatives are asked to assist the operation by blacking out network 
broadcasts from launch points prior to the landing of forces in the area of operation…. 
Do not approach military personnel, especially during hours of darkness, without  
express military approval….News media representatives who are not accredited  
with the Joint Task Force Joint Information Bureau (JTB) will not be permitted  
into forward areas….Security at the source will be the primary and desired means  
of protecting the operations security of the mission and enforcing the media ground  
rules. 
(*8) Note the following passage from the Defense Department’s “Haiti Operation Media Ground 
Rules,” issued September 16, 1994: 
 
…the media will be provided timely access to t11e operation, subject to operations 
security and legal consideration. However, situations may arise in which movement  
of news media representatives will be restricted or in which a media pool is necessary. 
 
(*9) A survey of news executives listed ten new communication technologies the press used in 
the Gulf War: electronic mail and computer-to-computer communications; digital transmission 
of still photographs; facsimile transmission; portable satellite telephones; remotely sensed 
satellite imagery; frame capture of video images to print; laptop computers; international data 
transmission networks; flyaway satellite uplinks; and computer graphics (Dennis et al., 1991, p. 
35). All of these technological changes increase the speed of newsgathering and reporting, which 
stresses or bypasses the traditional security mechanisms. 
 
(*10) Not everyone is satisfied with a moderate role for the press. Some critics have charged that 
despite its assertions to the contrary the mainstream press acts nor as a watchdog but as a mouth-
piece for government interests (e.g., Parenti, 1993; Solomon, 1992), particularly when military 
operations are concerned. Nonetheless, it is hard to discount the stridency of the mainstream 
press’ protests about the Gulf War restrictions simply because the protests operated within the 
“system.” 
 
(*11) Even while aware that the government had withheld information about the war from them, 
57% answered “give military more control” to a January 1991 Times Mirror poll question 
whether the government or the press should exert more control over the Gulf War reporting. In 
the same survey, another item asking “do you think the United States military is hiding bad news 
(about the Gulf) from the public or do you think it is telling the public as much as it can under 
the circumstances?” generated a 78% response of “telling as much as it can” (Milavsky, 1991, p. 
32). If the wartime polls on news coverage constitute something of a referendum on the press 
restrictions, there is ample reason to believe a majority of Americans “feel that censorship for 
national security is more important than the media’s ability to report the news the way it wants to 
report it” (Lichter, 1991, p. 2).  
     That the public entrusted the government with a higher degree of control over information 
during the Gulf War than it would tolerate in peacetime is not unprecedented. A poll taken 
during World War II showed 55% of the respondents supported “having official government 
spokesmen write the war news for the papers and broadcast it over me radio” (Milavsky, 1991, p. 
32). 
 
(*12) The dramatic change in U.S. policy goals in Somalia following the publication of pictures 
of mistreated American casualties is illustrative of the potency of news coverage in public 
dialogue about war (see, for instance, Gordon & Friedman, 1993). This relationship between me 
press and government policy is not unique to the United States, but a characteristic of a political 
system which allows a free press in an age of electronic communications (e.g., Erlanger, 1994 on 
the impact of the newly-free Russian press on government efforts to suppress a rebellion in 
Chechnya). 
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